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“NO HARM, STILL FOUL”: 
UNHARMED CREDITORS AND AVOIDANCE 
OF A DEBTOR’S PRE-PETITION TRANSFER 
OF EXEMPTIBLE PROPERTY 
ALYSSA POMPEI† 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. and Mrs. Smith are Florida residents who have owned 
their home for two years.  Both of them have been trying hard to 
make ends meet, but bills have been mounting since Mr. Smith 
got laid off and their daughter needed physical therapy not 
covered by insurance.  Sick of having to take the phone off the 
hook to avoid the debt collectors’ incessant calls, Mr. Smith 
decides that it might be time to file for bankruptcy.  He performs 
a quick Google search on Florida bankruptcy law and realizes 
that under the Florida Constitution, the homestead is exempt 
from a forced sale if it is owned by a “natural person.”1  Still 
feeling uneasy because the bills and deed to the home are in his 
name, he decides to transfer the property to his wife to make 
sure it is safe from creditors.  He reasons that if the house would 
be exempt from a forced sale after he files for bankruptcy there is 
no harm in transferring it early to avoid premature claims by 
overeager creditors.  Anxious about the prospect of creditors 
trying to take his home, he has his lawyer draw up a deed 
transferring the home to his wife for twenty dollars in 
consideration.  Six months later, he files for bankruptcy.  
Immediately after his first court appearance, the court-appointed  
 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2015, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., Economics, 2012, University of Connecticut. 
The author would like to thank Professor Keith Sharfman for serving as her advisor 
of this Note. 
1 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a) (“There shall be exempt from forced sale . . . the 
following property owned by a natural person: (1) a homestead . . . ”). 
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trustee overseeing the estate files suit against Mrs. Smith to 
recover the property her husband transferred to her alleging it 
was fraudulently transferred.  What result to Mr. Smith? 
The plain language of the Florida statute seems 
straightforward:  The trustee would not be able to avoid Mr. 
Smith’s transfer of his homestead which occurred prior to his 
petition for bankruptcy because the property is exempt under 
Florida state law.2  The United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Florida decided accordingly, analyzing these 
types of transfers under a “no harm, no foul” approach.3  Under 
this reasoning, if the creditor is not harmed by the pre-petition 
transfer of property otherwise exempt from the bankruptcy 
estate under state law, the pre-petition transfer cannot be 
avoided.4  However, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Florida is in the minority regarding decisions on this 
issue.5  The majority of federal courts have held that under § 548 
of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),6 a trustee can avoid a debtor’s 
pre-petition transfer of property, regardless of whether the 
property would have been otherwise exempt under applicable 
state laws, because such a transfer constitutes a “fraudulent 
conveyance.”7  This reasoning stems from the notion that all 
property is part of the bankruptcy estate until the debtor claims 
an exemption.8  Thus, allowing pre-petition transfers could harm 
creditors because it is never definite that a debtor will claim an 
available exemption.9 
The core principles of federal bankruptcy law, codified in the 
Bankruptcy Code, are twofold: (1) to ensure maximum and 
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets among creditors and 
(2) to give the debtor a fresh start.10  The fraudulent conveyance11 
2 Id. 
3 See Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1995); see also Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1995). 
4 In re Fornabaio, 187 B.R. at 782. 
5 See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that a 
majority of courts have rejected the “no harm, no foul” approach). 
6 11 U.S.C. §  548 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407–08; Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re 
Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 351, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
8 Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407. 
9 See, e.g., id. 
10 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)). 
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and preferential treatment12 provisions of the Code help achieve 
the first goal by protecting creditors’ claims to the bankruptcy 
estate.  The Code furthers the fresh start goal by allowing the 
debtor to protect certain assets from creditors by exempting them 
from the bankruptcy estate.13  However, the interests of the 
creditor and debtor conflict when determining whether a debtor 
should be permitted to transfer otherwise exempt property prior 
to his petition for bankruptcy.  On one hand, courts could protect 
the rights of the creditor by deeming all pre-petition transfers of 
assets “fraudulent” regardless of their status as exempt under 
state law.  Alternatively, courts could aim to protect the debtor’s 
right to a fresh start by determining that unless a creditor’s 
financial interests are harmed, the transfer cannot constitute a 
“fraudulent conveyance” if the assets would be exempt under 
state law. 
This Note sides with the “no harm, no foul” approach in this 
debate, arguing that bankruptcy courts should not avoid pre-
petition transfers of otherwise exempt property under § 548 
simply because an exemption was not actually taken and the 
transfer was instead the alternative path used to shield the 
property from collection.  Part I of this Note explains the 
constructive fraud and exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, including state opt-out provisions which are particularly 
applicable to this issue.  Part I also discusses the legislative 
history of federal bankruptcy law with particular focus on the 
creation of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, which altered the 
definition of the bankruptcy estate.14 
11 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (allowing a trustee to avoid a transfer by a debtor made 
with actual or constructive fraudulent intent). 
12 Id. § 547(b)(1) (allowing a trustee to avoid a transfer by a debtor that gives 
preference to one creditor over another). Many of the cases cited in this Note analyze 
the “no harm, no foul” approach under both § 547 and § 548. In this Note, however, 
only § 548 is analyzed, although both provisions are treated the same for purposes of 
the “no harm, no foul” framework. See In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 351 (“[N]o 
distinction should be drawn based upon whether the trustee asserts a preferential 
transfer or a fraudulent conveyance has taken place.”). 
13 Id. § 522; see also Dana Yankowitz, Comment, “I Could Have Exempted It 
Anyway”: Can a Trustee Avoid a Debtor’s Prepetition Transfer of Exemptible 
Property?, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 217, 218 (2006). 
14 See id. § 522(g); cf. Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 299 
(1903) (holding that the bankruptcy estate never succeeded to the debtor’s exempt 
property). 
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Part II addresses the split of authority among the United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a trustee can 
avoid a pre-petition transfer of otherwise exempt property.  Part 
III argues that the minority “no harm, no foul” approach is the 
best approach for courts to take when analyzing pre-petition 
transfers of exempt property under the Bankruptcy Code.  On the 
basis of this argument, Part IV recommends amending 
§ 548(a)(1) to reflect the “no harm, no foul” approach. 
I. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Bankruptcy Code aims to protect creditors’ interests in 
the debtor’s bankruptcy estate by allowing a trustee to avoid 
certain transfers of property.15  This system serves as a safeguard 
against other provisions of the Code that allow the debtor to 
protect certain assets from the reach of creditors during 
bankruptcy proceedings.16  These opposing goals serve as the 
main source of conflict for the differing views of courts regarding 
a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of exempt property.17 
A. Statutory Provisions 
1. Fraudulent Conveyances 
Many debtors facing bankruptcy seek to transfer assets to a 
third party to keep property out of the reach of creditors.  One 
way debtors seek to accomplish this goal is by having the third 
party transfer the asset back to the debtor after bankruptcy 
proceedings have concluded, which allows the debtor to escape 
the consequences of bankruptcy scot-free.  The starting point for 
a trustee to avoid such a transfer by a debtor is 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1), the fraudulent conveyance provision.18  
Section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the 
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, 
that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date 
of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily— 
15 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
16 Id. §§ 522(b)(2), 544(b)(1). 
17 See infra Part II; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547 (preferential transfers); id. § 548 
(exemption provisions). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
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(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the 
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer 
was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of 
such transfer or obligation . . . .19 
Thus, under § 548(a)(1)(A), a trustee can avoid any transfer 
by a debtor which was transferred with the “actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors within two years of filing for 
bankruptcy.20  Section 548(a)(1)(B) allows a trustee to avoid 
constructively fraudulent transfers in which a debtor’s exchange 
of property was for less than a reasonably equivalent value and 
made while the debtor was either insolvent or rendered insolvent 
by the transfer.21 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), a bankruptcy trustee has whatever 
avoiding powers an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim 
might have under applicable state or federal law.22  Courts have 
interpreted § 544(b) as allowing a trustee to use applicable state 
law to avoid a transfer as fraudulent under the federal 
Bankruptcy Code.23  Most states have adopted the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which has now been renamed the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 Id. Note that § 548(a)(1)(A) refers to actual fraud, while § 548(a)(1)(B) refers 
to constructive fraud. Id. 
20 Id. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
21 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)(I). The statute also avoids constructively fraudulent 
transfers if the debtor’s exchange of property was less than a reasonably equivalent 
value and made while the debtor intended to become insolvent by the transfer or if a 
debtor was left with unreasonably small capital by a transfer pursuant to a debtor’s 
engagement in a business transaction. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii)(II), (ii)(III). 
22 Id. § 544(b)(1). 
23 Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
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Uniform Voidable Transaction Act24 (“UVTA”), which will govern 
a trustee’s power to avoid a transfer as fraudulent under 
§ 544(b).  The UVTA has similar avoidance language to § 548.25 
2. Exemptions 
The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to exempt certain 
assets from the bankruptcy estate.  Section 522 allows the debtor 
to exempt property which could be exempted under applicable 
state law.26  Most states have specified exemptions for debtors 
under state law—most notably, the homestead exemption.27  
Additionally, although the Code allows the debtor to choose 
between exemptions under federal or state law, most states 
require a debtor to use applicable state law when exempting 
property.28  However, the Bankruptcy Code does limit the 
exemptions which can be taken by a debtor.  Under § 522, a 
debtor’s aggregate interest in exempt property cannot exceed 
$22,975.29 
The exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Code promote 
important interests of bankruptcy law.  They give the debtor a 
safety net and further the goal of allowing the debtor a “fresh 
start” after filing for bankruptcy.30  These provisions ensure that  
 
 
24 To date, forty-three states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”)—which has now been renamed the 
Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and includes some changes from the UFTA—in 
state legislation. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Fraudulent Transfer Act—Now Known 
as Voidable Transactions Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfe
r%20Act%20-%20now%20known%20as%20Voidable%20Transactions%20Act (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
25 See Uniform Voidable Transactions Act § 4(a) (2014). The UVTA provides 
“badges of fraud” to determine whether a conveyance by a debtor is voidable by a 
creditor. Id. § 4(b)(2) (listing factors that the official comments to § 4 refer to as 
“badges of fraud”). Note that the newly adopted UVTA has changed the language of 
the UFTA, which referred to fraudulent transfers instead of voidable transactions.  
See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a) (1985). 
26 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). 
27 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (Florida homestead exemption); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (2015) (Louisiana homestead exemption); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 188, § 1 (2015) (Massachusetts homestead exemption). 
28 See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 123 (1997). 
29 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). 
30 See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918). 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 293 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 293 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_POMPEI 4/6/2016  4:11 PM 
2015] “NO HARM, STILL FOUL” 973 
a debtor and his family are not destitute following proceedings 
and have some way of rejoining normal economic society in the 
future.31 
3. Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate 
The language of 11 U.S.C. § 541 defines the property which 
constitutes the debtor’s estate at the commencement of a 
bankruptcy proceeding.32  This language provides the source of 
conflict which has divided the circuit courts on the issue of 
whether a pre-petition transfer of otherwise exempt property can 
be avoided by a trustee as a fraudulent transfer.  Section 541 
provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he commencement of a 
case . . . creates an estate.  Such estate is comprised of . . . all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”33 
This section provides that the debtor’s bankruptcy estate is 
comprised of all the debtor’s interests in property at the 
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.34  As discussed in 
Part II, the courts place a great deal of emphasis on this 
provision of the Code when determining whether a conveyance is 
fraudulent under § 548(a)(1).  The classification of a debtor’s pre-
petition transfer of property will turn largely on whether courts 
read § 541 as prohibiting debtors from transferring property 
until after they file for bankruptcy, including property otherwise 
exempt from creditors under state law. 
B. Legislative History 
The treatment of a debtor’s exempt property has 
continuously evolved under federal bankruptcy laws since the 
introduction of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898.  Congress has 
amended the language of the bankruptcy laws to reflect the 
changing characterization of the bankruptcy estate, and it has 
instituted limitations on state-established exemptions for the 
debtor.35  The history of federal bankruptcy law illustrates the 
31 See id. 
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
33 Id. § 541(a)(1). 
34 Id. 
35 See Posner, supra note 28, at 100–01 (discussing how the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 created a minimum floor for federal exemptions, allowing debtors to 
choose between state exemptions and federal exemptions). 
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source of federal courts’ divergent views on the treatment of a 
debtor’s pre-petition transfer of property and on the role of state 
law in determining a debtor’s fate. 
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (“1898 Act”) explicitly 
incorporated state exemption allowances.36  Under the 1898 Act, 
the bankruptcy estate never succeeded to the debtor’s exempt 
property.37  Additionally, the 1898 Act disallowed characterizing 
a debtor’s transfer as fraudulent if state law exempted the 
property from the debtor’s estate.38  Later amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Act made this result more apparent by defining 
property of a debtor that could be fraudulently conveyed as 
inclusive of only his nonexempt property.39 
State exemption laws varied greatly at the time the 1898 Act 
was in effect.40  The lack of consistency led to a call for the 
creation of a uniform system of exemptions.41  However, federal 
and state interests divided sharply over exemption policy because 
the states historically controlled this realm of bankruptcy law.42  
Federal bankruptcy law continued to incorporate state 
exemptions immediately preceding the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197843 (“1978 Reform Act”).  Federal 
exemptions did exist, but while they supplanted many state 
exemptions, “the federal exemptions did not play a significant 
role in bankruptcy cases.”44 
36 See id. at 63. 
37 See id. 
38 See Yankowitz, supra note 13, at 224–25. Property fraudulently conveyed by a 
bankrupt debtor “shall . . . be and remain a part of the assets and estate of the 
bankrupt” but only if “the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts 
by the law of his domicile.” Id. at 225 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 
§ 67(e), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978)). 
39 See G. Stanley Joslin, Insolvency in Bankruptcy: A Synthesis, 38 IND. L.J. 23, 
26 (1962). 
40 Posner, supra note 28, at 63 (“Many exemption statutes were archaic, singling 
out bibles, guns, crops, or farm animals. They reflected the rural origins of states 
that had since become highly urbanized. Some allowed debtors to waive the 
exemptions in a contract, others did not. Some allowed debtors to avoid liens, others 
did not.”). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 94–95. 
43 Id. at 95. 
44 Id. 
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2. 1978 Revisions 
a. Treatment of State Exemption Law 
The 1978 Reform Act marked a significant effort by Congress 
to establish a more uniform set of exemption laws for bankruptcy 
proceedings brought under federal law.45  This Act created what 
is considered the modern-day Bankruptcy Code.  However, 
Congress’s attempt did not fully solve the problem, and the 
House Bill that was eventually passed established a set of federal 
exemptions but gave the debtor the right to choose between 
federal and state exemptions.46  The federal exemptions 
essentially provided a “floor” for debtors—they included a 
$10,000 dollar exemption limit for the homestead and a $5,000 
exemption limit for miscellaneous personal property.47  With the 
passage of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress in effect ceded to state 
power and “franchis[ed] exemption policy to the states.”48 
b. Treatment of the Debtor’s Estate Under § 541(a)(1) 
Although the 1978 Reform Act left exemption law in the 
hands of the states, it altered judicial treatment of state 
exemption law through other changes.  The primary example of 
this alteration can be seen in the language of § 541(a)(1) 
following the 1978 revisions.  Under the newly established 
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor’s bankruptcy estate succeeds to “all 
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case.”49  Thus, § 541(a)(1) has the effect of 
overruling case law interpreting the 1898 Act.50  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the 1898 Act as explicitly excluding 
property exempted under state law from the debtor’s assets in a  
 
45 See id. at 99–101. 
46 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C.§ 522 (2012). 
47 Posner, supra note 28, at 100–01. 
48 Id. at 108. Congress’s retreat from uniformity and its institution of a floor 
may have been a result, in part, of the influence of state officials. See id. at 105. 
Additionally, state governments are perceived to have more information about local 
interests than the federal government, which allows the states to satisfy local 
interests more successfully through tailored exemption laws. Id. at 105–06. 
49 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
50 See Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 B.R. 339, 350 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1990). 
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bankruptcy proceeding.51  Under the 1978 Reform Act, however, 
property of the estate includes “all property of the debtor, even 
that needed for a fresh start.”52 
The enactment of § 541(a)(1) marks the point of controversy 
that fuels the current circuit split over pre-petition transfers of 
exempt property.  Although § 522(b) allows a debtor to elect the 
use of state exemption law, § 541(a)(1) defines the debtor’s estate 
as all interests of the debtor in property.  It is difficult to 
determine how these provisions coincide and the ultimate effect 
this has on fraudulent conveyances under § 548(a)(1).  For 
example, § 522 allows a debtor to opt out of the federal exemption 
scheme and elect to use state law exemptions.  This allowance 
implies that pre-petition transfers of property cannot be 
considered fraudulent conveyances if they are allowed under the 
state law that applies to the debtor.53  However, § 541 and 
§ 548(a)(1), when read alone, seem to bar pre-petition transfers.  
Section 541 states that a debtor’s bankruptcy estate consists of 
all interests of the debtor in property,54 and § 548(a)(1) allows a 
trustee to avoid “any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in 
property.”55  This reading appears to give the bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction over a debtor’s exempt property and to allow  
pre-petition transfers to be avoided as fraudulent.56 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Since the inception of the Bankruptcy Code, circuit courts 
have been divided over whether a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of 
otherwise exempt property constitutes a fraudulent conveyance 
under § 548.  The majority of courts have held that a trustee can 
avoid such a transfer under § 548(a)(1).  However, a minority of 
courts have applied the “no harm, no foul” doctrine and have 
refused to let a trustee avoid a pre-petition transfer if the 
property would be exempt under applicable state law. 
51 Lockwood v. Exch. Bank of Fort Valley, 190 U.S. 294, 299 (1903). 
52 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978). 
53 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1). 
54 See id. § 541(a)(1). 
55 Id. § 548(a)(1). 
56 See id. 
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A. Majority Position: The Wickstrom Approach 
The majority of circuit courts have held that a trustee can 
avoid a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of potentially exempt 
property under the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”).  This 
determination is based on two main arguments:  (1) The “no 
harm, no foul” approach to § 548 is misguided, and (2) language 
in the Bankruptcy Code would be rendered superfluous by the 
adoption of the “no harm, no foul” approach.57 
1. “No Harm, No Foul” Rejected 
The majority of circuits disagree with the “no harm, no foul” 
approach because they believe that the minority of courts 
prematurely dismiss the interests of the creditor in state-law 
exempt property.58  According to the majority, all property, even 
potentially exempt property, is part of the bankruptcy estate 
reachable by creditors under § 541 until the debtor claims an 
exemption.59  Thus, the majority of circuit courts believes that “no 
harm, no foul” is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.60 
For example, in the seminal case of Lasich v. Wickstrom,61 
the debtor transferred real property and money to his parents 
and son approximately three months before he filed for 
bankruptcy.62  The trustee of the debtor’s estate sought to recover 
the transfers as a fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a).63  The 
transferees contended that the transferred property was exempt 
under state law, and therefore the creditors could not be harmed 
by the transfers.64  The court acknowledged the divergent 
decisions by courts on pre-petition transfers of potentially exempt 
property under the Code.65  However, the court refused to adopt 
57 See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding the 
majority approach for two reasons: “§ 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code apparently 
anticipates this result . . . [and] the ‘no harm, no foul’ approach is misguided”). 
58 See, e.g., id. at 407. 
59 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (“[An] estate is comprised of . . . all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”); see also 
Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407. 
60 See, e.g., Tavenner, 257 F.3d at 407. 
61 113 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
62 Id. at 341–42. 
63 Id. at 340 (noting that the trustee also sought to recover the transfers as 
preferential transfers under § 547(b)). 
64 Id. at 346. 
65 Id. at 346–47. 
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the “no harm, no foul” approach.66  It stated that a transfer must 
be analyzed “in accordance with what happened” and not on the 
hypothetical assertion that the creditors would not have been 
have been able to reach the exempt property.67  The court 
concluded that “ ‘no harm, no foul’ . . . seem[s] to ignore the 
possible rights that creditors have in potentially exempt 
property.”68 
Courts following the Wickstrom approach seek to protect the 
creditor’s interest in potentially exempt property based on the 
argument that a debtor’s actions can never be determined with 
complete certainty.  In other words, a court cannot predict which 
property a debtor will exempt.69  For example, in Tavenner v. 
Smoot,70 the debtor received a settlement from his employer for a 
work-related injury under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.71  
The debtor transferred the settlement into an account held by a 
corporation of which his wife and children were the sole 
shareholders.72  He filed for bankruptcy several months later and 
claimed an exemption for the settlement money he had 
transferred.73  The trustee sought to avoid the debtor’s transfer of 
the settlement funds as fraudulent.74 
The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the “no harm, no foul” 
approach based on its “misguided” nature.75  The court 
summarized its view of the flawed reasoning behind the minority 
approach: 
Under a statutory scheme in which all property is presumed to 
be part of the bankruptcy estate, and no property is exempt 
until such time as the debtor claims an exemption for it, 
creditors can be harmed by transfers of potentially exempt 
property because it is not a foregone conclusion that such 
property will be exempt from the estate.  Potentially exempt 
property can be used to satisfy the demands of the creditors if 
the debtor never claims the exemption.76 
66 Id. at 352. 
67 Id. at 346. 
68 Id. at 348. 
69 See id. at 346. 
70 257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001). 
71 Id. at 404–05. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 405. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 407. 
76 Id. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the Wickstrom court’s rejection of “no harm, no foul” 
based on the potential rights of creditors.77  Additionally, the 
court noted that § 548 did not require that a fraudulent 
conveyance cause actual harm to a creditor, nor does § 548 
exclude transfers of exempt property from its scope.78 
Lastly, the debtor in Sullivan v. Welsh79 transferred her 
homestead to her parents less than one year before she filed for 
bankruptcy.80  The trustee sought to avoid the transfer as a 
fraudulent conveyance under § 548(a).81  The bankruptcy court 
held that because the homestead was exempt under state law, it 
was not capable of being fraudulently transferred, and therefore 
its transfer could not be avoided under the applicable state law.82  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
rejected the lower court’s argument, and the “no harm, no foul” 
approach completely, in favor of the Wickstrom approach.83  The 
court held that “while state law determines the nature of a 
debtor’s interest in property, it does not determine whether a 
transfer of that interest is fraudulent under § 548.”84  
Accordingly, the court held that § 548 does not apply to property 
which would have been exempt because this approach is 
inconsistent with the structure of the Bankruptcy Code.85 
2. Majority Support for § 522(g) 
Courts following the Wickstrom approach find support in 
§ 522(g) of the Bankruptcy Code for their position that a debtor’s 
pre-petition transfer of exempt property should be avoidable by a 
trustee.  Section 522(g) provides: 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (“[F]or if a debtor enters into a transaction with the express purpose of 
defrauding his creditors, his behavior should not be excused simply because, despite 
the debtor's best efforts, the transaction failed to harm any creditor.”). 
79 457 B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011). 
80 Id. at 751. 
81 Id. at 751–52. 
82 Id. at 752. 
83 Id. at 754. 
84 Id. at 753 (“[I]f the Bankruptcy Court is correct that courts are to look to the 
same state fraudulent transfer law under § 548 as under § 544, then no purpose 
would be served by § 548.”). Thus, a trustee is not limited by applicable state law 
under § 548(a), even though the trustee would be limited by the applicable state law 
available to an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim under § 544(b). See id. 
85 Id. at 754. 
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Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor 
may exempt under subsection (b) of this section property that 
the trustee recovers . . . to the extent that the debtor could have 
exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section if 
such property had not been transferred, if— 
(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such 
property by the debtor; and 
(B) the debtor did not conceal such property . . . .86 
While there is no explicit language in the Code that 
voluntary transfers are avoidable, courts that follow the 
Wickstrom approach interpret the Code in this way based on 
Congress’s choice to include involuntary transfers.87  For 
example, the court in Tavenner v. Smoot88 relied upon this 
language as an indication that Congress intended for a trustee to 
be able to avoid a debtor’s transfer of exempt property.89  The 
Tavenner court reasoned that a debtor should be denied an 
exemption for property transferred in these cases because 
“§ 522(g) . . . apparently anticipates this result.”90  Because 
§ 522(g) allows a debtor to exempt property in certain 
circumstances, such as in the case of an involuntary transfer, the 
majority of courts reasons that Congress purposely decided not to 
allow a debtor recourse under the Code for his voluntary pre-
petition transfer of exempt property.91 
B. Minority Position: “No Harm, No Foul” Under the Treiber 
Approach 
The minority of courts continue to adhere to the “no harm, no 
foul,” or diminution of estate, approach.  Under this theory, a 
transfer of property that a debtor would have been able to claim 
as exempt is not considered fraudulent under § 548.  Because the 
86 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2012). 
87 See id.; see also Yankowitz, supra note 13, at 232 (“Section 522(g) does not 
explicitly state that a trustee can avoid a debtor’s prepetition transfer of exemptible 
property. But it provides that the debtor can exempt such recovered property if the 
requisite factors are fulfilled under subsection (1). This presupposes that the trustee 
can avoid the transfer in the first place.”). 
88 257 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2001). 
89 Id. at 406–07. 
90 Id. at 406. 
91 See id. at 406–07; see also In re Gingery, 48 B.R. 1000, 1004 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
1985) (“A literal reading of Section 522(g) compels the conclusion that a recovered 
asset cannot be exempted if it was transferred voluntarily regardless of whether or 
not such transfer was concealed.”). 
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debtor would have been able to exempt the property and remove 
it from the reach of his creditors, his creditors are no worse off as 
a result of the transfer than they would have otherwise been 
absent the transfer.92  Thus, the assets the creditor would have 
received are not diminished in any capacity. 
1. Background of “No Harm, No Foul” 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
initially addressed the issue of pre-petition transfers of exempt 
property in In re Agnew.93  In In re Agnew, a debtor transferred 
his interest in his homestead, which he and his wife had both 
held as tenants by the entirety, to his wife, and his wife 
subsequently sold the home.94  The creditor argued that the court 
should deny the debtor discharge because his transfer was made 
with the intent to defraud his creditors and to remove the 
proceeds from the sale of the property from the reach of his 
creditors.95  The Seventh Circuit stated that in order for the court 
to deny discharge, the creditor must show that the debtor 
transferred property, which reduced the assets available to the 
creditor, and that the transfer was made with fraudulent 
intent.96  Because state law exempted entire property and 
proceeds from its sale from the reach of creditors, the court held 
that it was it was impossible to conceive of a logical  
reason to hold that a conveyance of property not  
 
 
92 See, e.g., Lee Supply Corp. v. Agnew (In re Agnew), 818 F.2d 1284, 1289–90 
(7th Cir. 1987); Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1995); Jarboe v. Treiber (In re Treiber), 92 B.R. 930, 933–34 (Bankr. N.D. 
Okla. 1988). 
93 See generally In re Agnew, 818 F.2d 1284. 
94 Id. at 1286. 
95 Id. Note that the debtor brought his claim in this case under 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), which has essentially the same language as the fraudulent 
conveyance language in § 548(a). See id. Section 727(a)(2) prohibits the court from 
denying a debtor discharge under certain circumstances: 
[If] the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has 
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted 
to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed— 
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of 
the petition; or 
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
96 In re Agnew, 818 F.2d at 1289. 
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subject to the claims of creditors could be fraudulent.97  
Accordingly, it ruled in favor of the debtor and denied the 
creditors’ claims.98 
The case which first set forth the “no harm, no foul” 
argument is Jarboe v. Treiber99 (“In re Treiber”).  In In re Treiber, 
a debtor transferred his one-half interest in his homestead 
property to his wife within one year of filing for bankruptcy.100  
The trustee of the estate attempted to avoid the conveyance, but 
the court found in favor of the debtor because the homestead was 
exempt under state law.101 The court determined that no creditor 
was harmed when the subject of a transfer was potentially 
exempt property because the creditors would not share in the 
value of the property even if it had not been conveyed.102  “In 
short,—no harm, no foul.”103 
The Treiber court found that even if the trustee were to avoid 
the conveyance, the debtor and his family would still have a 
homestead exemption in the property which would be superior to 
any rights of the trustee.104  Accordingly, the court would not 
allow the creditors to indirectly defeat the homestead interest of 
the debtor’s family where they could not do so under state law.105 
Similarly, the debtor in In re Fornabaio106 executed a deed 
relinquishing his rights to his homestead property in favor of his 
wife.107  The trustee sought to avoid the conveyance, asserting 
that the debtor transferred the property “with the intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud his creditors.”108  The court, while noting 
the divergent views on whether exemptible property could be 
avoided by a trustee, held in favor of the debtor.109  The court 
expressly disagreed with the Wickstrom line of cases which 
97 Id. at 1289–90. 
98 Id. at 1290. 
99 92 B.R. 930 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988). 
100 Id. at 931. 
101 Id. at 933–34. 
102 Id. at 932. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 934 (“To hold otherwise would simply allow the husband’s creditors to 
indirectly, through the trustee, defeat the homestead interests of the wife and family 
when they could not do this acting their own.”). 
106 Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). 
107 Id. at 781. 
108 Id. Note that this case was also brought under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). See 
discussion supra note 96. 
109 In re Fornabaio, 187 B.R. at 782–83. 
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allowed for avoidance of transfers of potentially exempt property, 
stating, “The Bankruptcy Code was not enacted to penalize 
debtors for filing bankruptcy.”110  The court refused to join the 
majority of courts because it reasoned it would be penalizing the 
debtor for an otherwise legal action under the homestead 
exemption laws of the state.111  It instead adopted the Treiber 
approach of “no harm, no foul.”112 
2. “No Harm, No Foul” Application to § 548(a)(1) 
Later decisions by courts following the Treiber approach 
applied the “no harm, no foul” language to bankruptcy 
proceedings brought by trustees under § 548(a)(1) or the 
intentional fraudulent conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code.113 
In the case of Malone v. Short114 (“In re Short”), a trustee 
obtained a judgment in bankruptcy proceedings against the 
debtor in state court.115  The debtor subsequently transferred his 
joint interest with his wife in his home to sole ownership by his 
wife.116  The trustee sought to avoid the debtor’s transfer of his 
interest in the property under § 544(b)117 and § 548(a)(1), arguing 
that the debtor transferred the property to his wife with the 
actual intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud” his creditors.118  
However, the debtor claimed that a transfer of homestead 
property, which is exempt from the reach of creditors under 
Florida state law, could not be made with the intent to defraud 
creditors.119  The court agreed with the debtor’s argument, 
holding that the transfer could not be avoided under applicable 
state law and § 544(b) because Florida law exempts the 
110 Id. at 782. 
111 Id. at 782–83. 
112 Id. at 782. 
113 Because the language of § 548(a) is almost identical to the discharge 
language in § 727(a)(1), the earlier “no harm, no foul” decisions involving § 727 are 
directly applicable to avoidance actions under § 548. See discussion supra note 96. 
114 188 B.R. 857 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
115 Id. at 858. 
116 Id. 
117 The trustee’s claim under § 544 was that it could avoid transfers avoidable 
under applicable law, which the court held included state law. Id. at 858–59. Here, 
Florida state law defined a fraudulent transfer as one made with “actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud” a debtor’s creditor. Id. at 859. 
118 The trustee’s claim under § 548 referenced § 548(a)(1), the fraudulent 
conveyance provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. 
119 Id. at 858. 
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homestead from the claims of creditors, and therefore a 
homestead cannot be transferred with the intent to defraud 
creditors.120  The court also held that the transfer could not be 
avoided under § 548(a)(1) because the property was exempt at 
the time of the transfer, and the transfer could not have been 
made with the intent to “hinder, delay, or defraud creditors 
pursuant to § 548(a)(1).”121  Thus, the court refused to allow the 
trustee to avoid the transfer because of the property’s exempt 
character under state law in accordance with the Treiber 
approach.122 
More recently, in Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. v. Gredd,123 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York interpreted the language of § 548(a)(1) in accordance with 
the “no harm, no foul” approach.124  The Gredd case involved a 
trustee seeking to recover proceeds from a debtor’s sales of 
securities within one year of its bankruptcy petition, which the 
trustee alleged were “transferred fraudulently” under 
§ 548(a)(1)(A).125  The trustee urged the court to reject the “no 
harm, no foul” approach put forth by the debtor.126  However, the 
court declined to adopt the Wickstrom approach and rejected the 
trustee’s request.127 
The court based its rejection of the trustee’s reading of 
§ 548(a)(1)(A) on both textual interpretation and policy 
concerns.128  First, the court relied on the Supreme Court and 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpretations of “property of 
the debtor” under § 547(b) of the Code, which both courts found 
to mean “property that would have been part of the estate had it 
120 Id. at 859–60 (holding that there could be no intent to defraud where 
creditors “would have had no claim to the property whether it was transferred or 
not”). 
121 Id. at 860. 
122 See id. 
123 275 B.R. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
124 Id. at 192. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 192–93. The trustee argued that this approach was misguided because 
the plain language of § 548(a)(1)(A) does not require a showing of the diminution of 
the creditor’s resources and because this requirement would “render section 
548(a)(1)(B)—the constructive fraud provision—superfluous.” Id. (internal quotation 
mark omitted). 
127 Id. at 193. The court acknowledged that the trustee’s reading of 
§ 548(a)(1)(A) had support in opinions by various courts. Id. (citing Tavenner v. 
Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
128 Id. at 193–96. 
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not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy 
proceedings.”129  While this interpretation pertained to the 
preferential treatment of creditors under § 547, and not 
fraudulent conveyances under § 548, the court “construe[d] this 
language to have the same meaning when it is used in 
§ 548(a)(1)(A)” based on the rules of statutory construction.130  
Thus, for the purposes of § 548(a)(1), the court held that a trustee 
could only avoid “an interest of the debtor in property” if the 
asset transfer had “actually harmed creditors.”131 
Second, the Gredd court reasoned that its requirement that a 
fraudulent transfer must actually harm at least one creditor 
fulfills the “overarching purpose” of the Bankruptcy Code.132  A 
fraudulent transfer that does not make a creditor worse off than 
he would have been had the transfer not occurred “obviously does 
not offend the policy behind § 548(a)(1)(A).”133  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that a creditor must incur actual harm to avoid a 
fraudulent transfer under § 548.134  The court also noted that the 
transferee bears the initial and ultimate burden of proof to 
demonstrate that the transferred assets were never available to 
any creditor.135  This ensures that a court’s reading of § 548 is not 
overly favorable to the debtor.136 
III. “NO HARM, NO FOUL” SHOULD TRUMP  
THE WICKSTROM APPROACH 
The “no harm, no foul” doctrine under the Treiber approach 
embodies the most logical reading of the Bankruptcy Code when 
viewed in its entirety.  The procreditor stance under the 
Wickstrom approach in these proceedings represents a valiant 
129 Id. at 193–94 (quoting Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
130 Id. at 194 (stating that identical words in different parts of the same act are 
generally understood to have the same meaning absent legislative intent to the 
contrary). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 195. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. Because under federal law these funds were not available to satisfy 
obligations by the debtor, the court denied the trustee’s avoidance action. Id. at 198. 
135 Id. at 196. 
136 Placing the burden on the transferee helps to ensure that the trustee does 
not have to face the overwhelmingly difficult task of initially proving its diminution 
of estate when seeking to avoid a transfer. Id. Additionally, a transferee will rarely 
be successful in making such a showing. See id. 
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attempt to ensure that creditors are not harmed by a debtor’s 
early transfer.  However, the Wickstrom approach is misguided 
and overreaching in its interpretation of § 548.137  Based on (1) a 
plain language interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, (2) the overarching principles of bankruptcy 
law, and (3) the already-high burden placed on the transferee in 
pre-petition transfers of exempt property, the Treiber approach 
effectively balances the rights of creditors and debtors in 
avoidance proceedings while ensuring adherence to both the 
actual language and overall purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.138 
A. Plain Language of the Bankruptcy Code 
1. Flaws in the Majority Approach 
The Wickstrom approach taken by the majority of courts 
relies heavily on the language of the Bankruptcy Code (“the 
Code”) in reaching the conclusion that pre-petition transfers of 
exempt property can be avoided as fraudulent conveyances.139  
Courts using the Wickstrom approach are correct in stating that 
the Code does not explicitly provide for removing potentially 
exempt property from the reach of creditors.  However, the 
Bankruptcy Code also does not explicitly provide for allowing a 
trustee to avoid such pre-petition transfers.140  Much of the 
statutory language relied on under the Wickstrom approach only 
has implicit meaning, which supports the notion that the 
Bankruptcy Code should not allow for the avoidance of these 
transfers.141 
 
137 The majority reads § 548 independently, instead of viewing it in conjunction 
with the other sections of the Bankruptcy Code, namely § 522 and § 544(b). See 
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012) (allowing for a debtor to opt out of federally-created 
exemption rights and use state exemption rights instead); Id. § 544(b)(1) (giving the 
trustee whatever avoiding powers an unsecured creditor with an allowable claim 
might have under applicable law). 
138 See infra Part III.A–C. 
139 See supra Part II.A. 
140 Pre-petition transfers are not mentioned anywhere in § 548(a)(1). See 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). 
141 See infra Part III.A(1)(a)–(b). 
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a. Language of § 522(g) 
As discussed in Part II.A.1, the court in Tavenner v. Smoot 
relied upon § 522(g)(1) of the Code as an indication of Congress’s 
definitive intent to treat all transfers of exempt property by a 
debtor as avoidable by the trustee.142  However, the court did not 
acknowledge the fact that the beginning language of § 522(g) 
subjects the trustee to the limitations of § 550 of the Code. 
Section 550 of the Code requires the trustee to have 
recovered the property under § 548 or another applicable 
provision.143  If a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of potentially 
exempt property is not fraudulent for the purpose of § 548(a)(1), 
the trustee cannot avoid the transfer of property as a fraudulent 
conveyance under § 548(a)(1), and § 522(g)(1) would not apply to 
the fraudulent conveyance proceeding.144  Courts that read 
§ 522(g)(1) as always allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s pre-
petition transfer of exempt property are making an assumption:  
Section 548 already characterizes these transfers as 
fraudulent.145  This assumption shows the inherent flaw in this 
argument taken under the Wickstrom line of cases. 
b. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
Courts following the Wickstrom approach rely primarily on 
the language of § 541(a)(1), which defines the bankruptcy estate, 
in allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of potentially 
exempt property.146  Under § 541(a)(1), the bankruptcy estate is 
comprised of “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property.”147  As noted in Part I, this definition marks a change 
from the treatment of the estate under the 1898 Act.148  Under  
 
142 Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001). 
143 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 22(g)(1), 550(a) (2012). 
144 See id. § 550(a). 
145 See id. For a court to reach the conclusion that § 522(g)(1) renders a debtor’s 
transfer of exempt property avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance, it is necessary to 
determine that the trustee has already recovered the property at issue under § 548. 
See id. Without this determination, § 522(g) will never apply to the fraudulent 
conveyance proceeding. See id. 
146 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see, e.g., Lasich v. Wickstrom (In re Wickstrom), 113 
B.R. 339, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990). 
147 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
148 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing how under the 1898 Act, the trustee never 
succeeded to the debtor’s exempt property); see also supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing 
the introduction of the § 541(a)(1) language to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code). 
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the Wickstrom approach, many courts rely on this change in 
determining that a trustee can avoid transfers of exempt 
property. 
Courts that have adopted the Wickstrom approach 
acknowledge that under the 1898 Act, property exempted from 
the bankruptcy estate under state law was unreachable by 
creditors.149  However, the courts read § 541(a) as invalidating 
that approach because “[a]ll” property becomes part of the 
bankruptcy estate.150  Therefore, Wickstrom courts hold that all 
property, including potentially exempt property, becomes part of 
the bankruptcy estate until the debtor claims an exemption.151  If 
the debtor transfers the property prior to filing for bankruptcy, 
the debtor loses the ability to claim the property as exempt.152 
This argument does not necessarily nullify the entire “no 
harm, no foul” approach.153  The language of § 541(a) does bring 
all assets of the debtor within the bankruptcy estate,154 which 
results in the court having the ability to adjudicate the creditor’s 
rights in those assets.155  However, the court’s ability to 
adjudicate these rights does not nullify the “no harm, no foul” 
approach entirely.  Section 541(a)(1) gives the court the ability to 
adjudicate parties’ rights with respect to exempt property.156  It 
does not bar the court from determining that pre-petition 
disposition of exempt property is not fraudulent because it 
caused no harm to the creditor.157 
 
149 See, e.g., In re Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 350. 
150 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
151 Sullivan v. Welsh (In re Lumbar), 457 B.R. 748, 754 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); 
see also Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 406–07 (4th Cir. 2001). 
152 In re Lumbar, 457 B.R. at 754–55. 
153 See Nino v. Moyer, 437 B.R. 230, 235 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that while 
this particular rationale for “no harm, no foul” is no longer valid, its failure does not 
necessarily “nullif[y] established . . . precedent”). 
154 See id. 
155 Id. at 235–36. 
156 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012). 
157 Moyer, 437 B.R. at 236. The Moyer court noted that “no harm, no foul” should 
possibly be inapplicable to preferential transfers by a debtor, which could harm the 
creditor, but that that rationale is not persuasive for unrelated fraudulent 
conveyance proceedings. Id. at 237. 
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2. The Treiber Approach Correctly Interprets the Plain 
Language of § 548 
a. Compliance with Exemption Statutes Cannot Be Fraudulent 
Under § 548(a)(1) 
Section 548(a)(1) defines two types of fraud: actual fraud158 
and constructive fraud.159  Actual fraud is when a debtor makes a 
transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a 
creditor.160  Constructive fraud is, in relevant part, when a debtor 
“received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
[a] transfer,” and was “insolvent on the date that such transfer 
was made . . . or became insolvent as a result of such transfer.”161 
Courts following the Wickstrom approach have determined 
that a debtor’s pre-petition transfer can be characterized as 
actual fraud as long as the debtor “had the requisite fraudulent 
intent.”162  They reason that § 548 does not explicitly require 
actual harm to the creditor, so a trustee may avoid any transfer 
made by a debtor with the intent to keep the property from the 
reach of creditors under § 548(a)(1)(A).163  Transfers between 
immediate family members fall into this category and create a 
“presumption of fraudulent intent” according to the majority.164 
However, this argument has one major flaw:  How can a 
debtor have the requisite fraudulent intent when he believes he 
is transferring property in compliance with state exemption law?  
The majority’s attempt at defining actual fraud through the 
debtor’s intent adheres to the language of § 548(a)(1)(A) on the 
surface, but it ignores the very reason the debtor may be 
transferring the property in the first place.  Where state 
exemption law prohibits creditors from reaching certain property 
and a debtor transfers that property, creditors incur no harm 
because they have no rights to the property.  Consequently,  
 
 
158 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
159 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(B)(ii). 
160 Id. § 548(a)(1)(A). 
161 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i)–(B)(ii)(I). 
162 See Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001). 
163 Id. The court described transfers between related parties as being “closely 
scrutinize[d]” and stated that these transfers create a presumption of actual fraud if 
made in the absence of adequate consideration. Id. at 408. 
164 Id. 
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debtors do not act with fraudulent intent because they believe 
they have no need to defraud creditors when acting in accordance 
with state law.165 
Some courts following the “no harm, no foul” approach under 
Treiber have recognized this flaw in the Wickstrom approach’s 
argument and have disallowed penalization for a debtor’s 
“otherwise legal action.”166  If property is exempt under 
applicable state law, courts following the Treiber approach have 
held that the transfer cannot be avoided as having been made 
with the intent to hinder, defraud, or delay a creditor 
automatically;167 this is because the debtor cannot possess the 
requisite intent if state law exempts the property.168 
Furthermore, the constructive fraud provision’s language 
cannot be used to avoid a transfer of exempt property if a creditor 
has no valid claim.  While the Bankruptcy Code does not define 
“reasonably equivalent value,” it has been noted that what 
constitutes a reasonably equivalent value must be determined 
from the view of the debtor’s creditors.169  Thus, unless an 
unsecured creditor is made worse off because the debtor received 
an amount significantly less than what it paid, no fraudulent 
transfer has occurred.170  Under this definition of “reasonably 
equivalent value,” a creditor with no rights to a debtor’s exempt 
property cannot be logically made worse off by a debtor’s transfer 
of the property because they have no stake in exempt property.  
If the transfer has no effect on the bankruptcy estate, the 
transfer cannot constitute constructive fraud.171 
 
165 Cf. id. at 407 (“[I]f a debtor enters into a transaction with the express 
purpose of defrauding his creditors, his behavior should not be excused simply 
because, despite the debtor’s best efforts, the transaction failed to harm any 
creditor.”). 
166 Kapila v. Fornabaio (In re Fornabaio), 187 B.R. 780, 782–83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1995). 
167 Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 B.R. 857, 860 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). 
168 See id. 
169 Jack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8 
BANKR. DEV. J. 55, 80 (1951) (“The focus is on the consideration received by the 
debtor, not on the value given by the transferee. The purpose of fraudulent transfer 
law is the preservation of the debtor’s estate for the benefit of its unsecured 
creditors.” (footnote omitted)). 
170 Harman v. First Am. Bank of Md. (In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Grp., Inc.), 
956 F.2d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1992). 
171 Id. at 485. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 302 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 302 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_POMPEI 4/6/2016  4:11 PM 
2015] “NO HARM, STILL FOUL” 991 
b. Interpretation of § 548(a)(1) Under the Treiber Approach 
Coincides with Other Provisions of the Code 
As discussed in Part I.A, § 544(b)(1) allows for an unsecured 
creditor to avoid any interest of a debtor in property that is 
voidable under applicable state law.172  However, where state law 
incorporates exemptions for a debtor, the statute disallows the 
creditor from bringing a claim under § 544(b).173 
Despite what seems like protection for state exemption laws 
under § 544(b)(1), courts following the Wickstrom approach still 
allow a trustee to reach otherwise exempt property under 
§ 548(a)(1) solely based on the timing of the transfer.  Under the 
Wickstrom approach, courts reason that because the debtor 
transfers the otherwise exempt property prior to filing for 
bankruptcy, the debtor relinquishes all exemption rights in the 
property.  It is unclear why the Wickstrom courts allow trustees 
to circumvent the language of § 544(b)(1) and use § 548(a)(1) as a 
method of reaching a debtor’s exempt property.  Such a reading 
of § 548(a)(1) indicates the majority approach’s tendency to look 
at § 548(a)(1) in isolation, instead of in conjunction with other 
provisions of the Code that provide for allowances of state law 
exemption. 
Under the minority approach, § 548(a)(1) is read in 
conjunction with the rest of the Code.  Thus, § 544(b) and 
§ 548(a)(1) produce similar outcomes.  Just as § 544(b) bars a 
creditor from seeking relief under state law which prohibits such 
an action, the minority’s approach to § 548(a)(1) bars a creditor 
from seeking relief by characterizing a debtor’s transfer as 
fraudulent where state law provides an exemption to the debtor 
for the property.174  Reading § 548(a)(1) as accounting for the 
state law exemption provisions allowed under § 544(b) results in 
a more coherent treatment of state law exemptions.175 
 
172 See supra Part I.A. 
173 See supra Part I.A. 
174 See supra Part II.B. 
175 Where state law exempts certain property from the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate, a trustee cannot avoid a transfer of that property under § 548(a)(1) because it 
has no valid claim under applicable state law. See Malone v. Short (In re Short), 188 
B.R. 857, 859–60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). If read from the majority view, § 548(a)(1) 
would essentially ignore the language of § 544 because it would disregard state law 
exemptions in allowing a trustee to avoid such a conveyance. See id. 
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Reading § 548(a)(1) as allowing a debtor’s pre-petition 
transfers of exempt property to be free from a trustee’s avoidance 
action also coincides with § 522(b) of the Code.  Section 522(b) 
allows for an individual debtor to opt out of the federal 
bankruptcy scheme and to elect to use applicable state law.176  It 
therefore makes little sense to read an exclusively federal-
controlled exemption scheme into § 548(a)(1) when Congress 
explicitly provided for states to have significant control in the 
realm of exemptions as evidenced by its opt-out language.177  The 
treatment of § 548(a)(1) under the Treiber approach with respect 
to state exemption provisions logically coincides with the opt-out 
language in § 522(b).  If § 548(a)(1) is given a meaning that does 
not account for § 522, it makes it unclear why the language of 
§ 522 explicitly allows a debtor to elect to use applicable state 
law, including state exemption laws. 
B. Policy Concerns and the Overarching Principles of 
Bankruptcy Law 
Two of bankruptcy law’s central policies or principles are 
(1) to provide the debtor with a fresh start and (2) to distribute 
the estate’s assets fairly among creditors.178 
1. A Debtor’s Fresh Start 
Bankruptcy law seeks to protect a debtor’s interests 
following the completion of a bankruptcy proceeding.  The 
purpose of filing for bankruptcy is for the debtor to obtain “a new 
opportunity in life . . . unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.”179 Congress’s central 
purpose in creating the Bankruptcy Code was to ensure this 
fresh start for debtors, unburdened by preexisting debts.180  
However, the Wickstrom approach does little to further this goal. 
 
176 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012). 
177 See id. 
178 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918)). 
179 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180 Stoltz v. Brattleboro Hous. Auth. (In re Stoltz), 315 F.3d 80, 94 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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Exemption provisions, such as a homestead exemptions, 
further the debtor’s ability to obtain a fresh start by protecting 
some of the debtor’s property from the reach of creditors.  Under 
the Wickstrom approach, a debtor can be penalized for adhering 
to state exemption provisions, which were put in place to protect 
essential assets regardless of the bankruptcy.  Courts following 
the Wickstrom approach punish the debtor solely based on his 
decision to make a transfer before filing for bankruptcy, instead 
of waiting until he files.  Legislatures specifically enacted 
exemption legislation to protect the debtor and his need for a 
fresh start;181 the Wickstrom approach undermines this 
legislation by allowing a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of 
exempt property where such transfer is allowed under state law. 
In contrast to the Wickstrom approach, courts should 
liberally interpret exemption statutes so that a debtor’s fresh 
start is not impaired.182  By protecting a debtor’s transfer of 
exempt property from creditors with no legal interest in the 
property, the “no harm, no foul” approach under Treiber ensures 
that the debtor maximizes its ability to have a fresh start at the 
conclusion of the bankruptcy.183 
2. Creditors’ Rights to the Debtor’s Bankruptcy Estate 
Courts have a duty to ensure equal treatment of all creditors 
in a bankruptcy proceeding.184  This duty includes obtaining a 
“maximum and equitable distribution” for all creditors.185 
However, bankruptcy proceedings provide a forum for the 
recognition of already-acquired rights,186 which indicates that 
bankruptcy proceedings do not create rights for creditors that 
they did not have prior to the institution of the proceedings.187 
181 See Sensenich v. Molleur (In re Chase), 2005 WL 189711, at *7 (Bankr. D. Vt. 
Jan. 27, 2005) (noting that statutes which endanger the debtor’s homestead 
exemption can jeopardize a debtor’s fresh start). 
182 See, e.g., In re Brody, 297 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
183 In contrast, the majority allows trustees with no legal interest in the exempt 
property transferred by the debtor to create an interest simply due to the timing of 
the transfer. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
184 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
185 Id. 
186 In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 407 (2d. Cir. 1966). 
187 See id. (“Bankruptcy does not provide a forum for the realignment of rights 
or priorities . . . .”). 
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The Treiber approach to § 548 coincides with this principle of 
the Bankruptcy Code, as well.  Because the purpose of § 548(a)(1) 
is to prevent a debtor from putting assets otherwise available to 
creditors out of their reach,188 a proper reading of § 548(a)(1) 
would only allow a trustee to avoid a debtor’s transfer of property 
if the creditors had preexisting claims in the debtor’s property.  If 
the debtor’s property constituted exempt property under 
applicable state law, creditors should not have a claim to the 
property.  The principles of bankruptcy law would not be 
furthered by furnishing additional rights to the trustee.189 
C. The High Burden on a Transferee Limits Abuse of § 548(a)(1) 
One of the main concerns regarding a debtor’s transfer of 
exempt property prior to bankruptcy is that creditors will not 
receive the full reimbursement they deserve.190  However, the 
court in Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. v. Gredd explained how 
this potential harm is adequately limited by the “no harm, no 
foul” approach.191  In Gredd, the court stated that the transferee 
carried the initial and final burden for proving that the creditor 
was not harmed by the pre-petition transfer, and it set forth the 
standard that must be met by the transferee to satisfy the court 
that the creditor was not harmed by the transfer.192  The court 
demanded: 
[T]he transferee must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the 
court that the transfer did not (1) reduce the res that would 
have been available to any creditor or creditors, (2) “hinder, 
delay, or defraud” any creditor or creditors, nor (3) have any 
other adverse impact on any creditor or creditors generally.193 
 
188 See Williams, supra note 169, at 63. 
189 See id. at 128 (“In our quest to understand fraudulent transfer liability, we 
often overlook its first principles. At its core, fraudulent transfer law is a debt-
collection device and not a revenue-generating tool; its mission is to prevent the 
unjust diminution of the debtor’s estate.”). 
190 See, e.g., Tavenner v. Smoot, 257 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[C]reditors 
can be harmed by transfers of potentially exempt property because it is not a 
foregone conclusion that such property will be exempt from the estate.”). 
191 See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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The court noted that the trustee already bears a difficult 
burden because she must prove that the transfer was made with 
“actual intent” to defraud creditors.194  It therefore justified the 
adoption of the diminution of estate approach by explaining that 
the transferee had the ultimate duty to establish that the 
creditor was not harmed by the transfer.195 
Placing the burden of proof on the transferee, instead of the 
trustee, adequately limits the risk of harm to the creditor that 
courts following the Wickstrom approach often anticipate in their 
decisions.  The transferee cannot get away with such a transfer 
without consequences.  Instead, the transferee must show that 
the assets were never available to any creditors and that the 
creditor suffered no harm in a proceeding under § 548(a)(1)(A).196 
CONCLUSION 
The “no harm, no foul” approach as applied to § 548(a)(1), 
which denies an avoidance remedy with respect to transfers of 
otherwise exempt property, should trump the Wickstrom 
approach.  If a debtor transfers property prior to the initiation of 
a bankruptcy proceeding, and that property is protected from the 
reach of creditors under state exemption law, the creditor incurs 
no harm and therefore should have no rights to that property.  
This approach is supported by the plain language of § 548(a)(1) 
and other relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
overarching principles of bankruptcy law, and the already-high 
burden on the transferee to prove that the transfer resulted in no 
loss to the creditor.  Additionally, the Bankruptcy Code has 
clearly allowed for the application of state exemption provisions 
in other parts of the statute.197  Reading § 548(a)(1) in  
 
 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. The Gredd court referenced 5 Collier on Bankruptcy at 548–25, which 
places the burden of showing “a harmless effect when the fraudulent intent is made 
out” on the transferor-defendant, not the transferee. Id. However, regardless of 
whether the burden is on the transferee or the defendant, the trustee will often 
prevail due to this high burden by the opposing parties. See id. (“If [the trustee] 
succeeds in demonstrating, which we expect will be rarely . . . .”). This will limit any 
harm to the creditors, which is ultimately what the majority of courts is concerned 
with. 
197 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(1), 544(b)(1) (2012). 
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conjunction with those provisions leads to the logical conclusion 
that state exemption laws should dictate a trustee’s avoidance 
power in fraudulent conveyance proceedings. 
Lastly, an amendment to § 548(a)(1) to reflect the exclusion 
of a debtor’s pre-petition transfer of exempt property from the 
fraudulent conveyance definition198 would resolve the ambiguity 
as to its meaning and thereby ensure a uniform judicial approach 
to the transfer of exempt property.  This solution would also 
ensure that the Bankruptcy Code coincides with state preference 
in the realm of exemption law, which is reflected by 
overwhelming adoption of the UVTA by the states.  Therefore, an 
adoption of the “no harm, no foul” approach under Treiber as 
reflected in a change to § 548(a)(1) would be the most effective 
resolution to this conflict. 
 
198 Where applicable state law provides for such an exemption. See id. § 544(b). 
